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WAGES POLICY AT MALTA DRYDOCKS: 
ANALYSIS OF AN AMBIVALENCE 
Godfrey Baldacchino 
INTRODUCTION 
Relatively high and fixed wage rates in a self-managed firm operating 
with chronic non-profitability may read as economic nonsense.! This is 
however the present reality of Malta Drydocks, and a matter which has 
been for some time at the forefront of public debate. Unfortunately, the 
argument has been both simplified and polarized by partisan statements, 
making it difficult to break through the cliches and to seek an objective 
analysis of the situation. 
This paper attempts to serve as a valid contribution towards a cool, 
dispassionate discussion of the Drydocks condition. It probes into the 
apparent ambivalence which surrounds the sensitive issue of what is 
herein referred to as 'wages policy' - namely, the determination of wage 
rates and wage structures and their relationship to enterprise productivity 
and profitability. 
Malta Drydocks has been subjected to regular monitoring and 
research during its period of participatory management.2 The emphasis 
of such analysis has however tended to focus on the social consequences 
of worker participation and on worker perceptions. The element of wage 
policy per se has so far only been considered within the subjective 
framework of relative deprivation.3 The utter absence of a formal, 
academic contribution to this specific topic may be taken as a strong 
indicator of the field's sensitivity. 
The paper's first task is to present a preamble into the specific 
historical processes which moulded a peculiar cultural condition at Malta 
Drydocks. A series of incentives and disincentives towards increased 
productivity are next posited but the emerging policy recommendations 
are confronted with the cultural syndrome to gauge their acceptability 
and therefore the likelihood of implementation. All in all, the paper hopes 
to provoke a wider awareness of a veritable 'hot potato', suggesting the 
poverty of. a pure economic analysis. This is handled squarelY'within 
the spirit of an overall development strategy.4 
A CHEQUERED HISTORY OF ACTIVISM 
Research has identified that industrial workers in shipbuilding and 
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ship repair traditionally exhibit a high degree of union consciousness and 
militancy. All over the world, dock workers are more prone to be 
organised in trade unions and are more liable to be aggressive in the 
pursuit of their demands.s 
Such a universal condition may be attributed to a cluster of factors: 
The relative physical concentration of the workforce in a clearly defined 
territory with a visible demarcation from the world outside generates 
feelings of self-identity, ethnocentrism and camaraderie; the contact with 
sailors and passengers from foreign ships also increases the opportunities 
to interact with new, progressive ideas. The relatively highly skilled 
composition of the workforce also increases its lobbying power in 
negotiations. 
The same conditions have applied to the workers at Malta Drydocks. 
When the first proper drydock was constructed at the head of Dockyard 
Creek in the 1850's, the average annual income of its 360 officers and 
men was already about £38 - which compared very favourably with 
the £25 earned at the time by a local University professor.6 In 1884, an 
attempt at forming a Workers' Union by Dockyard fitters was somewhat 
premature in relation to the social and religious climate of the period 
and the organisation was happily accommodated into its social 
environment as a mutual aid society for the sick and needy.7 Following 
the effects of Rerum Novarum, a social context less hostile to trade 
unionism saw the proliferation of various worker organisations. Amongst 
these was the Imperial Government Workers' Union, organised by a 
certain Henry Ear in July 1916. Composed of Dockyard workers, it was 
kept alive and strengthened - numerically and ideologically - by 
English employees brought over in the period.s A strike was called by 
the IGWU in May 1917 and was settled in the workers' favour, securing 
a 500/0 pay increase instead of the 100/0 first offered. Another union with 
considerable membership from dockyard workers, Branch No. 3 of the 
Workers' Union in England, was established in 1920 and was 
instrumental in laying the basis of a.Maltese Labour Party.9 
The General Workers' Union (GWU) was founded in 1943, also with 
a substantial membership and leadership of Dockyard workers. In the 
same period, and in spite of harsh warnings against industrial action 
in a state of war, dockyard workers went twice on strike to press for 
war bonus increases. Other, violent industrial actions took place in 1947 
concerning demands for a five day week and again in 1958 concerning 
the sudden, proposed rundown of the British Services from Malta, 
following which the Dockyard was transferred to a private, British 
commercial firm. . 
Such a chequered history of industrial activism and unrest reached 
a veritable escalation in the late 1960's: A successful export - oriented 
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industrialisation policy and a construction cum tourist boom led to a 
nationwide strong demand for labour, reversing the pessimistic economic 
projections of the U.N. Stolper Report. The bargaining position of 
Maltese labour thus improved considerably, resulting in substantial wage 
increases. IU A policy of bipartite industrial relations revolving around 
enterprise - based collective bargaining, however, led to a widening 
of income differentials. Thus a high degree of industrial unrest was 
fomented by certain sections of the labour force due to the perception 
of relatively better financial gains made by traditional reference groups 
and 'wage leaders': Those workers in public sector employment and those 
with the British defence establishments (See Table 1). 
TABLE 1: Industrial Action in Malta (1960 - 1973) 
Year No. of Work No. of Workers No. of Striker 
Stoppages Involved Days 
1960 8 6277 37676 
1961 3 514 20426 
1962 2 140 338 
1963 6 7082 8605 
1964 0 0 0 
1965 3 687 4154 
1966 9 615 11599 
1967 8 7838 27314 
1968 19 21220 58333 
1969 17 5892 41445 
1970 26 23979 148499 
1971 27 2577 24513 
1972 42 11999 14677 
1973 60 12513 42300 
--- ---- ---------
Source: Labour Reports, Dert. of Labour, 1960-1973. 
The Dockyard workers were not aloof from this general wave of 
relative deprivation. In their special case, the deprivation felt was more 
due to a perception of internal relativities. Disputes and industrial unrest 
had been taking place sporadicallY at the enterprise since its conversion 
into a commercial concern.ll After nationalisation by the Maltese 
Government in Apri11968, a first collective agreement for the (now Malta 
Drydocks Corporation) industrial workers was agreed to. In 1969, 
however, a second different agreement for non-industrials created 
differentials unacceptable to the Drydocks (Metal) Section of the GWU, 
representing the industrial workers. The GWU submitted a counter -
proposal, which sought wage increases for the industrial workers ranging 
from 470/0 to 63% in March 1970. Negotiations reached a deadlock in 
November, leading the GWU to resort to industrial action: The result 
was an overtime ban with a strike by fifty workers in key trades which 
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brought the Drydocks to a seven-month standstill. The workers felt 
relatively secure in pursuing their industrial dispute because the Prime 
Minister at that time, Dr. G. Borg Olivier, had given assurance that 'no 
matter what happened at Malta Drydocks, nobody would lose his 
employment'.12 In March 1971, with general elections looming three 
months ahead, Drydocks Management conceded to give the parity which 
the GWU was demanding for industrial workers. However, the union 
refused to accept the offer because this was tied to concessions intended 
to increase labour flexibility between trades. 
The 1970-71 industrial action at the Drydocks has probably been 
the most economically damaging industrial dispute in Malta's history 
as an independent nation. It involved the island's largest enterprise, its 
traditional working class stronghold, its largest workforce (then 60/0 of 
the total labour force) and the largest single earner of foreign exchange. 
Its contribution to the change in government following the outcome of 
the 1971 general election is believed to be substantial. The Drydocks 
crisis was one major issue in the election campaign and was conducive 
to ushering in a form of workplace democracy in the Drydocks' 
management. 13 
WORKER P ARTICIP ATION AS THE ULTIMATE PRESCRIPTION 
Participatory industrial relations were bestowed onto the Drydocks 
'from above' as an ad hoc attempt at grafting profitability and a 
harmonious industrial relations climate to an enterprise which, in its 
long history, had not known either one or the other. This, of course, 
was not an exceptional circumstance: As long as the Dockyard was run 
by the British Admirality, there was only emphasis on the quality of 
output, and hardly any interest in cost-benefit analysis on the part of 
workers, their management or even the colonial power as shipowner. 
With the transfer to commercial work, management sought to exercise 
new, different pressures to turn the Dockyard into a financially viable 
undertaking. The workers could not however be won over to collaborate, 
especially once management proved ready to accede to wage demands 
in the face of sufficient pressures. This acted as an incentive for still 
further industrial action and reinforced the tradition of antagonism.14 
With the prospects of a change in government in 1971, the GWU 
could not possibly maintain an antagonistic role in relation to its political 
partner, the Malta Labour Party (MLP), if and when the MLP would 
be in power and therefore assume the responsibility of managing the 
nationalized Drydocks. Some form of participatory management 
appeared to provide the elusive answer to industrial peace and to possible 
economic viability. And this was the prescription tabled in the joint MLP-
GWU 1971 election manifesto to solve the Drydocks crisis. 
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The prescription was administered immediately after the MLP 
victory. Co-determination was introduced followed in 1972 by an austerity 
programme, launched under pressure from the new Prime Minister Dom 
Mintoff. It included actual wage cuts of between 50/0 and 20% among 
different sections of the Drydocks workforce. As a consequence, internal 
wage relativities were also reduced (See Table 2). With the GWU and 
the Labour Government equally represented on the new Board of 
TABLE 2: Yearly Average Basic Wages and Differentials for 
Selected Drydocks Worker Categories 
1969 1974 1979 1982 
i 
Wage(Lm) Ratio Wage Ratio Wage Ratio Wage Ratio I 
Senior Staff 1760 4.11 1839 2.28 2853 1.98 4365 2.17 
Fitter 577 1.35 1027 1.28 1678 1.17 2472 1.23 
Semi-Skilled Tradesman 545 1.27 949 1.18 1623 1.13 2374 1.18 
Labourer 428 1 805 1 1438 1 2010 1 
--
Source: Malta Drydocks Wages & Salaries Department (various years) 
Directors and with the 'trust relations' existing between the Drydocks 
workers, 'their' party in government and the GWU, the Drydocks 
registered a profit in 1974. (See Table 3). This made possible the adoption 
of the long-proposed wage re-structuring and also enabled the transition 
to self-management to take place. As a result, labour relations were 
further harmonised by introducing democratic channels of worker control 
at the top decision-making level (via a Council elected completely by 
the workforce) in 1975 and at intermediate level (via 18 Workers' 
Committees) in 1977. In 1982-83, a number of mixed committees bringing 
together council members, management, workers' committee members 
and GWU officials were set up to plan atld advise on a number of specific 
issues: Safety, welfare, finance, purchasing. 
The history of the Drydocks thus makes it abundantly clear that 
the conditions of work, including wages and wage differentials, are issues 
over which Drydocks workers have been willing to undertake industrial 
action on so many occasions. Since the introduction of participatory 
management, however, a healthy strike - free industrial relations climate 
has also prevailed (See Table 4). One possible explanation for this 
noteworthy achievement is the very process of worker participation in 
management, which makes it easier for the worker to assimilate the 
enterprise's objectives as his very own. However, in spite of operating 
under such a self-management system, the general conditions of 
employment - and of wage structure in particular - are very similar 
to those prevailing in state-managed ehterprises: Wage rates are fixed 
and employees have 'security of tenure; wage increases are generally in 
terms of cost of living increases announced in the annual national budget 
33 
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TABLE 4: Industrial Stoppages at Malta Drydocks (1967 - 1984) 
YEAR No. of Days Workers Involved 
1967 1 
1968 5 
1969 9 
1970 42 
1971 118 
1972 0 
1973 1 
1974 0 
1975 112 
1976 0 
1977 0 
1978 0 
1979 0 
1980 1 
1981 1 
1982 0 
1983 0 
1984 1 
Source: Labour Reports, Dept. of Labour (various years). 
n.a. = not available 
4313 
4000 
160 
4228 
56 
0 
n.a. 
0 
82 
0 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
164 
0 
0 
1 
Striker - Days 
4313 
20000 
1440 
57234 
6608 
0 
Overtime Ban 
0 
41 
0 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
164 
0 
0 
1 
and therefore follow a nationwide trend; wage claims over and above 
these are determined by Management-Union negotiation. Bonuses have 
occasionally also been distributed as equal lump sums to each worker 
during years of exceptional performance: such was the case at the 
Drydocks during the year of record profit in 1981. Some Drydocks 
workers have also had the opportunity to participate in incentive schemes 
up till 1981 when extra money could be earned by finishing a contract 
before the due date. With such a wages policy in operation, Drydocks 
workers have successfully defended their wages, which are higher in 
relation to those enjoyed by other workers having similar skills but 
working in the private sector (See Table 5). They therefore remain, 
politically and economically, a 'labour aristocracy,.15 
The economic and political leverage of a 'labour aristocracy', as well 
as other factors specific to Malta Drydocks - its foreign exchange 
revenue; its large workforce; its multiplier effect on the Maltese economy 
- has therefore ensured the preservation of good working conditions 
and stable employment levels even in a situation of chronic loss. Since 
the Drydocks started registering once again negative balances in 1982, 
the necessary cash flows have been guaranteed by the Maltese 
Government via its control over the commercial banking sector. 
Nevertheless, the pressure is mounting to lessen the Drydocks' financial 
burden and to improve, in socially and politically acceptable ways, its 
overall viability. 
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TABLE 5: Wage Differentials at Malta Drydocks (F,I,L) with Respect 
to "Reference Group" in Private Industry (X) - in Terms of Current 
Prices 
1967 1974 1983 
Job Wage Ratio Wage Ratio Wage Ratio 
Category Rate Rate Rate 
Per Per Per 
Hour Hour Hour 
F 22c8 1.4 49c4 1.44 121c6 
I 22c1 1.36 45c6 1.33 114c2 
L 18c1 1.11 38c7 1.13 96c7 
X 16c3 1 34c2 1 86c2 
--- _ .......... _- -_ ....... _-
F - Fitter (Skilled Tradesman) at Malta Drydocks. 
I - Intermediate (Semi-Skilled Tradesman) at Malta Drydocks. 
L-Labourer (Unskilled Worker) at Malta Drydocks. 
1.41 
1.32 
1.12 
1 
--
I 
X- Worker in Private Manufacturing Industry: 'Metal Products except Machinery and Transport Equipment' 
Category - Male Workers Only. 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (various years) 
Drydocks Wages & Salaries Department. 
DISINCENTIVES TOWARDS IMPROVED VIABILITY 
A number of problematic areas can be identified as disincentives 
or obstacles to improved viability. Awareness of their influence is 
important in itself and may be instrumental in bringing about a change 
for the better, as far as the Drydocks balance of payments is concerned. 
Three such major areas are examined in turn below: 
WAGE DETERMINATION 
The first is the actual policy of wage determination: Wages policy 
and distribution tend to be arranged differently from the Drydocks in 
other firms practising self-management of some form or other. Firstly, 
wage levels and wage differentials are determined to some degree by 
certain criteria which need not remain constant. Most models of labour 
remuneration in a self-managed firm or economy in fact identify a fixed 
wage, being the basic wage rate, and a variable wage, determined 
according to one or more criteria. Such criteria could include experience, 
skill requirements, education, responsibility, physical effort and mental 
effort. 16 
Secondly, apart from these individual differences, wages tend to be 
connected, to some degree or other, to the economic performance of the 
enterprise. In this way, the fortunes of the enterprise are felt much more 
intimately by the worker to be his very own. This reflectivity of wage 
to performance should ensure, particularly in large firms like the 
Drydocks, a 'social participatory motivation to behave in a way which 
will promote the profitability of the enterprise'.17 
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In practice, this means that the maintenance of the wage rate at a 
high level (or else it being supplemented by a variable component) would 
depend directly on the existence and magnitude of registered profits.18 
The Yugoslav self-managed economy contains both these individual 
- linked and profit - linked incentives for the mobilization of the 
worker at his work. The Mondragon group of cooperatives in Spain have 
linked enterprise profitability to faster growth of workers' capital 
accounts. 19 In discussing the 'fundamentals of a theory of distribution 
in self-governing socialism', Horvat argues that earnings should 'typically 
reflect individual contributions by workers, while surplus-sharing is a 
reward for collective performance'; thus, the worker's income should 
consist of 'paid-out earnings and surplus sharing'.20 The existence of 
one or both incentive schemes described above is also found in other 
cases of self-managed enterprises in western economies.21 A third 
different type of incentive is the membership fee, making employment 
in a self-managed firm conditional to the payment of a sum of money 
or the purchase of a share.22 The membership fee qualification acts as 
an effective spur towards greater and better individual performance, 
apart from guaranteeing a degree of investment in the compa1).y. Such 
spurs are particularly useful and critical when the enterprise is operating 
in a harshly competitive market, as is the contemporary ship repair and 
shipbuilding industry - a condition which shows still no signs of abating. 
In contrast to these models of wage determination in a self-managed 
framework, Malta Drydocks has continued operating with a standard 
wage rate policy which guarantees relatively high and stable wages in 
spite of economic downturns. 
AUSTERITY MEASURES 
A second disincentive towards improved viability has been the series 
of austerity measures which were introduced at Malta Drydocks after 
1982. Such measures were put into effect as a reaction to the global slump 
in the shiprepair industry which affected the enterprise suddenly and 
significantly that same year. They have included (1) a freeze on new 
recruitment; (2) the withdrawal of incentive schemes for jobs which are 
finished before their due date and (3) the introduction of time-off-in-lieu 
instead of most overtime work arrangements. 
Such measures can, and do indeed, reduce financial costs. However, 
their long-run consequences may be counterproductive, acting as negative 
incentives. 
Firstly, the freeze on new recruitment has increased the mean 
Drydocks worker age to above 40 years.23 This is not a healthy sign in 
an enterprise where muscle and agility are important requisites for 
effective work, especially on board vessels. It is too much to expect over 
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fifty-year-olds to work at dizzy heights, in narrow double bottoms, in 
obnoxious and dangerous working conditions. Indeed, many Drydocks 
workers opt for less demanding work roles, switching over to lighter 
duties in the various offices and 'shops', once they reach a certain age 
or suffer an accident at their place of work. With a progressively ageing 
workforce, the proportion of productive workers in the total complement 
decreases and suggests an overall reduction of productive output per 
capita. At the same time, new techniques and skills in the art of ship repair 
are more difficult to come by without a regular influx of skilled workers, 
trained in contemporary methods and equipment. 
Secondly, the withdrawal of popular incentive schemes reduces the 
attraction of extra effort, particularly for those who used to earn most 
from such schemes - that is, the industrial, productive, so-called 'direct' 
workers. While the Drydocks may have been forced to lower its prices 
considerably to attract work in the last years, the losses accruing in this 
manner may have been offset, wholly or partly, by a larger turnover 
of vessels, using the existing berths, docks and other services nearer 
to 1000/0 utilisation and full capacity. Such a more rapid turnover of 
vessels may still be achieved, were some form of direct incentive made 
available. Of course, faster completion dates mean still greater 
competitivity and also reduce the penalties occasionally paid by the 
Drydocks, when a ship's repair list is not finalised by a targeted 
completion date, agreed upon in advance. 
Thirdly, the introduction of time-in-lieu (TIL) instead of overtime 
payments again hits adversely - financially and psychologically - the 
productive, 'direct' industrials, these being, again, that segment of the 
workforce which would accrue most overtime work. In fact, within a 
few months from the introduction of TIL, this measure had already 
become difficult to operate because workers in many key trades were 
accumulating hundreds of hours ofTIL, without any realistic prospects 
of taking leave, since they were practically in continuous demand at the 
Drydocks. 
Thus, all three austerity measures introduced in 1982 are argued 
to have acted as negative incentives, particularly on that segment of the 
Drydocks labour force which counts most, at the point of production, 
to get the job done well and on time. In fact, the Drydocks Council 
decided to abrogate two of these three austerity measures: Overtime 
work was resumed in October 1985 while a new apprenticeship entry 
was duly affected early in 1987. The incentive scheme has not been re-
introduced to date. 
THE ELEMENT OF SIZE 
Malta Drydocks is a large enterprise in two senses: It has a large, 
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sprawling, physical site and it has a large, permanent workforce. Both 
these factors act as further disincentives. 
The effect of group size on performance has been reported in studies 
concerning social psychology as a 'diffusion of responsibility' or, more 
popularly, as a 'free rider effect'. Such studies have revealed a rather 
uncanny, inverse relationship between feelings of responsibility and size 
of group. 
Self-management and participatory industrial relations seek 
generally to establish a stronger relationship between effort and 
productivity than what normally exists under traditional labour relations. 
It is clear that a worker hired at a fixed hourly wage in a traditional 
enterprise will have no immediate, personal, financial motive to behave 
in such a manner which will promote the profits of the enterprise, 
irrespective of whether the latter is state or privately owned. Various 
initiatives, including profit-sharing, the 'share economy' proposals in the 
United States and Soviet perestroika25 may be understood as 
managerial techniques which seek to tie more closely the workers' 
commitment to the goals of the enterprise where they work. Put 
differently, participatory management seeks to reproduce as closely as 
possible the kind of responsibility and effort which motivate self-
employed workers who are completely dependent on their self-discipline 
and work methods to generate output and, eventually, profits. However, 
the causal relationship between personal effort and personal reward is 
seen to degenerate progressively as the size of the workgroup incre(;lses, 
even where participatory management is practised. This tendency has 
also been referred to as a 'logic of collective action'.26 The uncanny 
thesis postulates that large groups are less able to act in their common 
interest than small ones because the incentive for group action diminishes 
as group size increases, unless selective incentives are introduced.27 
Consider an example to show this relationship in action: A self-
employed craftsman can be said to function with a 100% relationship 
between effort and output and, ultimately, profits. What would happen 
however in a self-managed enterprise, or a family business, or a worker 
cooperative, with n self-employed craftsmen working together? In this 
case, 'the individual worker who shares the profit with his fellows will 
still get some benefit from any additional profit due to his own effort; 
but it will be only an nth of the result of his own efforts. Thus, the larger 
the enterprise, the less the sense of profit participation and the weaker 
the social motivation to do the best for the whole partnership of fellow 
workers.'28 
Therefore, apart from disincentives already considered - a fixed 
'Wage structure and no incentive schelTIes to finish ship repairs ahead 
of due dare - El further diffu.sion of responsibility results from the sheer 
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magnitude of the Drydocks workforce, whereby only 1I4200th of personal 
effort may find its way as personal reward, if profit is registered and 
shared. A similar argument applies towards feelings of responsibility 
for losses. The size of work force thus reduces to insignificant levels the 
relationship between personal effort and personal sanction, be this 
positive (in cases of profit) or negative (in cases of loss). 
The sprawling nature of the worksite aggravates the matter further: 
It takes half an hour brisk walking to travel on foot - as is the normal 
means of internal transport - from the far end of No. 6 Red China Dock 
to the Boiler Shop beneath the Senglea Bastions or to No. 1 Dock in 
Dockyard Creek.29 This physical condition leads to evident problems 
of communications: Difficulty of effective supervision; difficulty of 
coordination between trades; waste of precious time spent on travelling 
to and from one's box rack to one's work station and/or to the foreman's 
office. The composite effect of large size and large workforce is an 
increasing sense of alienation from enterprise objectives. It is quite 
impossible to identify one's personal contribution to the overall 
performance of the Drydocks, since the only evidence of such 
performance is submerged beneath the enterprise's global, end-of-year 
statements. These are infreqti.ent and too occasional, and without a 
bearing on internal divisions of, say, territorial or departmental 
productivity achievements. There is no direct feedback relating what 
one has done to what one has achieved. Ideally, there could be a personal, 
but also a departmental or territorial based measure of feedback, and 
at shorter time intervals, to strengthen the relationship between effort 
and output; this is likely to contribute to productivity increases. 
It is interesting to note that, in the oasis of self-management found 
near the town of Mondragon, in Basque Spain, a strike was actually 
organised in 1974 in the largest production unit, called Ulgor, then with 
3250 worker-members. Following a diagnosis of this singular event, 
blame was partly put on inadequate communications caused by large 
size of plant and workforce leading to worker alienation. In consequence, 
the general policy at Mondragon has been to prevent 'giantism' by 
keeping unit sizes as small as possible.30 
To take stock of the argument then, it appears that a number of 
variables dampen the incentive and motivation of workers at the 
Drydocks towards even greater productivity and efficiency. These, along 
with other imported factors beyond local control, affect negatively the 
enterprise's profitability. Such internal ¥ariables include the rigidity of 
wage determination, the austerity measures introduced since 1982 and 
the consequence of large size. Reforms could be - and, indeed, have 
been - introduced to counter the effects of some of these variables. Yet, 
no reforms in wage determination have occurred. While the economic 
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pressures to do so certainly exist, it is impossible to isolate socio-political 
and cultural considerations from the analysis, if this is to prove relevant 
to the local situation. Indeed, an exploration of the cultural formation 
of the Drydocks workforce suggests that the environment is not likely 
to push for a change in this direction. 
A CERTAIN PATTERN OF EXPECTATIONS ... 
Being the elite of Malta's skilled labour force, the cradle of mass 
unionism and a stronghold of the MLP, the Drydocks has historically 
always played a key socio-political, apart from an economic role, as the 
first sections of this paper took pains to point out. From this has emerged 
the condition of a labour aristocracy: 'As a result of their effective 
organisation, Drydocks workers, in spite of all their grievances, have 
managed to raise their wages and to better their conditions of work well' 
above those of other workers in private industry.31 This advantageous 
position has bred over the years a certain pattern of expectations. Thus, 
for example, Drydocks workers have 'reacted very strongly whenever 
they felt that their advantageous position over comparative reference 
groups of other workers was being eroded'.32 Also, since the Drydocks 
started registering losses in 1982, the subsidy of necessary cash flows 
by the State, mainly via the two largest commercial banks, has been 
generally considered as a matter of course by workers. It is accepted 
as an implicit obligation from the State, in recompense for the Drydocks 
maintaining its labour force at the pre-recession levels. The arrangement 
also reflects a safe and secure compliance with paternalism on the part 
of the Drydocks worker which again undermines further the incentive 
towards effort: The State tends to act, in a neo-colonialist fashion, as 
a well-disposed patron on whom the security and income of the Drydocks 
worker depend. Thus the worker keeps getting his normal, standard 
wage, just as if he is operating in a viable, sheltered market, even when 
the economic pressure is strong for a downward swing.33 The 
problematic nature of this situation was perhaps being suggested by the 
then acting Pr:ime Minister, the Hon. Dr. K. Mifsud Bonnici, during a 
seminar on Workers' Participation organised for the GWU National 
Council: 
'Participating in management does not simply mean participating 
in profits but also means carrying your share of responsibility. In 
tim'es bf crisis, one should not shirk the responsibility of 
management and participate simply when things are progressing 
well. ,34 
In this context, it may be argued that the persistence of fixed and 
relatively high wage rates impervious to performance or profitability 
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criteria is an expectation by Drydocks' workers from the political system. 
This condition militates against the development of a self-reliant, self-
responsible, participatory consciousness. 
Admittedly, back in 1972, the Drydocks w-orkers did accept 
substantial wage cuts in the face of non-profitability. This w-as only agreed 
to, however, following a confrontation between the Prime Minister and 
the GWU and a fierce reaction on the workers' part. Then, however, 
there were a number of factors which contributed to the acceptance of 
wage revision: The powerful and charismatic leadership of Dom Mintoff; 
the willingness on the part of the Drydocks' labour force to undertake 
short-term sacrifices for the sake of desirable long-term goals (profit-
sharing and profitability); the enthusiasm following the election of a 
Labour Government some months before. Apart from these 
considerations, the workers were faced with no realistic alternatives. 
The Prime Minister made this clear: 
'Y ou have three choices to consider: Whether you want me to 
continue to be your leader, whether you want the Drydocks to be 
closed down or whether you want as from next Monday that 
everyone agrees to carry his share of the burden.'35 
... AND A STRONG UNION PRESENCE 
The wages policy pursued at Malta Drydocks is however not simply 
the result of some abstract and tenuous cultural syndrome. One 
significant, visible element of the cultural condition is the strong spirit 
of unionism present at the Drydocks. The Dockyards (Metal) Section 
of the GWU maintains practically a monopoly situation at the Drydocks 
with over 900/0 membership registered. Apart from its numerical strength, 
the benefits and concessions achieved over the years of antagonism and 
militant bargaining are still protected and guarded with pride. Among 
these is the instance on a clear demarcation of trade responsibilities; 
a myriad of allowances for various degrees of danger at work or for 
working in obnoxious conditions; a basic 40-hour, 5-day week and, of 
course, a fixed wage policy. The defence and preservation of these 
conditions of work has now been carried over into the participatory era; 
the strength of the union position and tradition is such that, apart from 
the GWU, even the participatory decision making bodies themselves 
- the Council and the Workers' Committees - feel very strongly that 
such conditions should not be waived. If they would, Drydocks workers 
are likely to finish off worse individually, even though the enterprise's 
financial position may improve. 
This interplay between the traditional and the participatory is no 
news as far as the Drydocks is concerned. Yet it is indeed peculiar to 
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find such an unusual blend of stable self-management and a strong union 
movement fashioned in the British spirit of antagonism. The latter 
condition was a major stumbling block to participatory experiments in 
the United Kingdom;36 while successful participatory initiatives in the 
United States and Basque Spain have not had to contend with an active 
union presence.37 Elsewhere, as in Yugoslavia, the trade union is not 
in a confrontative situation and, indeed, operates similarly to a managerial 
institution.38 At Malta Drydocks, the modus vivendi appears possible 
in spite of the apparent ambivalence because, in contrast to Yugoslavia, 
the participatory decision makers have effectively taken over and 
preserved the traditional trade unionistic perspective. The large 
proportion of Council and Worker Committee members have, after all, 
long experience as union activists, apart from being GWU members. 
Professional management has been, since 1975, the main target of the 
composite trade unionistic front (that is, GWU - Council - Worker 
Committees). One evidence of this is the relentless criticism voiced by 
managers against members of workers' committees on the (valid?) 
grounds that they are in practice acting as union stewards.39 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Restructuring wage levels and wage differentials under participatory 
management with trade union support has considerably improved labour 
relations at the Drydocks and led to a period of remarkable industrial 
peace. Nevertheless, the persistence of a fixed wage policy carried over 
from the pre-participatory epoch, unrelated to individual, group, 
departmental or territorial performance criteria, means that the worker's 
wage does not act as an incentive towards effort and higher productivity. 
This situation is in sharp contrast to many examples of self-managed 
firms elsewhere but understandable once the specific cultural condition 
is unfolded. 
Therefore, while a number of policy recommendations may be 
suggested, yet it is also likely that their acceptability depends on their 
conformity to cardinal trade union principles. For instance, the argument 
above has suggested the usefulness of considering the administration 
of a stronger, incentive-based wage policy, making more powerful the 
bond between labour remuneration and individual or group performance. 
One possibility here is to peg a small proportion of the basic wage rate 
to profitability levels, such levels being determined via joint management 
- union consultation. Contrary to contemporary proposals for similar 
wage flexibility in traditional firms,40 the participatory structure 
ensures that the worked out profit figures are just and genuine, since 
the trade union has direct access to the company's accounts. Such a 
measure would be fully within the spirit of self-reliance and self-
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management. The painful trade off involved in adopting such a measure 
is to forfeit fixed and equal wages for all in each grade, other than the 
usual service-based increments. From the workers' point of view, this 
is generally not attractive and would probably lead to effective pay 
reductions, at the going market conditions. Thus, the suggestion is not 
likely to be taken up by the Drydocks Council. 
A second major recommendation concerns the matter of de-
centralisation: Unless the source of surplus (or of deficit) is directly under 
the workers' control (for instance, in their own department), feedback 
from it can easily turn out to be counterproductive, causing still more 
frustration and acting therefore as a disincentive.41 Individual workers 
may be lazy and apathetic, but may still be rewarded by reaping profit 
bonuses if the enterprise as a whole turns out to be profitable. Conversely, 
individual workers' efforts and productivity may end up being not simply 
unrewarded but penalised by wage reductions if the enterprise as a whole 
registers losses. These possibilities help to explain why profit sharing 
does not necessarily boost productivity. Over and above this, the 'size' 
factor warrants independently a decentralised arrangement for the 
variable wage component: One which makes as direct and visible as 
possible the connection between individual effort and individual 
reward.42 Once again, from a union perspective, the arrangement is 
unpalatable because it foments internal rivalry and hostility among 
different sections of the Drydocks labour force. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of a series of registered losses at the Drydocks, wage rates 
have remained relatively high compared to those of allied workers in 
private industry.43 This is partly understood in terms of the bargaining 
success of Drydocks worker representatives (notably the GWU) in 
contrast to the generally less organised, less militant and less class/trade 
union conscious counterparts in the private sector. This is however also 
due to the distinct status with a strong historical, socio-political and 
economic foundation with which the Drydocks worker attributes himself 
quite automatically and which guides and moulds his political 
expectations. 
The general discussion above suggests that the problematic nature 
of wages policy at Malta Drydocks forms part of a complex set of 
ambivalences of attitudes and perceptions. At the root of these lies the 
blend of a fledgling participatory culture with the traditional one. As 
emerges from available scientific evidence,44 Drydocks workers express 
agreement with participatory management and appreciate its 
contribution to a series of socio-economic spin-offs; but these feelings 
remain encapsulated within a persistent 'us-them' vision of industrial 
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relations and neo-colonial expectations from a benevolent state.4S Fixed 
wage rates, impervious to market conditions and individual or group 
differences in effort, along with profit sharing when there is profit to 
be shared, reflect the colonial work ethic, with the accompanying 
implications of job security and low responsibility for the enterprise's 
business. It is due to these deep-rooted, cultural contradictions that a 
cardinal ambivalence - relatively high and fixed wage rates on the one 
hand and annual heavy losses on the other - is totally absent from the 
Drydocks worker's mind. 
Godfrey Baldacchino M.A. is the Research Assistant at the Workers' 
Participation Development Centre (WPDC), University of Malta. The 
paper was originally drafted in October 1985 and subsequently revised 
in March 1987 and June 1988. 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Ales Vahcic for prompting the ideas which led to the writing of this paper 
and Joe Portelli, Saviour Rizzo, Freek Schiphorst, Henk Thomas and Edward Zammit f~r going 
through the various drafts and presenting their constructive criticism. I also acknowledge the 
assistance of the Malta Drydocks Council for making this study possible. Responsibility for the 
contents is, of course, only mine. 
2 Notable studies and research reports focusing on Malta Drydocks include Baldacchino (1984); 
Baldacchino et. a!. (1986); Borg Bonello (1983). Gauci (1982); Kester (1974, 1980, 1986); Portelli (1983); 
Zammit (1981, 1984); Zammit & Baldacchino (1984); Zammit and Portelli (1983) and Zammit et. 
a!. (1980, 1982). All the above items are listed in a select bibliography included within the references 
to this paper. For a brief report on Malta Drydocks see Bradley & Gelb (1983, pp. 59-61). 
3 Relative deprivation may be defined as "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value 
expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life 
to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions 
they think they are capable of getting and keeping .... The emphasis of the hypothesis is on the 
perception of deprivation; people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations 
even though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want ... " - Gurr (1970, p. 24). 
4 Various recent official statements abide by the principle of relating more closely remuneration 
to effort. For example, the Nationalist Party 1987 Election Manifesto Section HI - 7.7, p. 65: 
"Schemes will be introduced to motivate self-employment ... and special individual initiative". 
Malta Development Plan 1981- 85: "Stronger efforts will need to be made at the Drydocks to re-
establish easier flow of communications between labour and management and to involve workers 
more deeply in efforts to raise efficiency and productivity." Also Malta Labour Party/General 
Workers' Union 1981 Election Manifesto, pp. 7-8: "Income differentials today have narrowed 
down ... therefore, the time is ripe for the introduction of incentive schemes for those workers 
who ar; involved in work which entails risk and/or responsibility and who show initiative to improve 
efficiency and production". Translations and emphasis mine. 
S Based on comparative studies of industrialised and industrialising countries which both suggest 
that workers in maritime "occupational communities" are amongst the most strike-prone, along 
with miners and transport workers. See Kerr & Siegel (1954) and Sandbrook (1981) respectively." 
6 As pointed out by Busuttil (1973, p. 12). 
4S 
7 As described in Bonnici (1931) and reported among others by Fino (1983, p. 18) and Dobie (1967, 
p.80). 
s Dobie (1967, pp. 81- 2) and Zammit (1984, pp. 43 - 4). 
9 Dobie (1967, pp. 82 -3). 
10 Koziara (1975, pp. 67 ff). 
11 Information on industrial relations at the Drydocks in the 1960's is based on Aquilina (1974); 
ElIul (1972); ElIul Galea (1973); Kester (1980, Chapter 4) and Koziara (1975). 
12 Ellul (1972, p. 30). 
13 The MLP -GWU electoral manifesto of 1971 stated that the Drydocks would be reorganised 
as follows by a Labour Government: 
- It would be run by a Board of Directors having equal representation from the GWU and from 
Government, with a Chairman acceptable to both sides. 
- Its management would eventually be handed over to the workers as soon as the Drydocks 
was put on an economically sound footing. 
14 Zammit (1984, p. 49). 
15 The meaning of a "labour aristocracy" in this context refers to a group of workers who have 
achieved a high status among the working class by virtue of class consciousness and radical unionism. 
The term begs qualification because widely contrasting versions, already present in 
Lenin's works where the concept was introduced, have been subsequently used. For an examination 
of these versions see Waterman (1975). 
16 See, for example, Wachtel (1973, Chapter 5) for a discussion of the wage in the Yugoslav self-
managed economy. 
17 Meade (1972) quoted in Vanek (1975, p. 395). 
18 See, for example, Ward (1958, 1967) for such a model of a labour-managed enterprise. 
19 Thomas & Logan (1982). 
20 Horvat (1967) also quoted in Jones & Svejnar (1982, pp. 147 - 8). 
21 For example, in the John Lewis Partnership (UK), remuneration has been "determined partly 
on job performance and partly on what must be paid to secure the worker's services. The rate 
of pay in turn determines the share of distributed profits" - Flanders et. al. (1968, pp. 181-2). 
In the U.S. Plywood Cooperatives of the Pacific NorthWest, every worker earns equal pay and 
every worker receives an equal share of the annual profits. The amount of hourly advance and 
annual refund are determined by each cooperative's Board of Directors. "When the market goes 
bad and the company loses money, the workers vote to cut their hourly pay" - Zwerdling (1973, 
p. 101). 
22 This is the arrangement in Mondragon and in many other producer cooperatives. However, 
this form of incentive is usually adopted by worker-owned enterprises. 
23 Indirect evidence collected from the responses of the 1982 Drydocks Opinion Survey. 
Baldacchino (1984, p. 36). 
24 For experimental evidence of "diffusion of responsibility" see Latane' & Darley (1968). 
25 On the share economy see Weitzman (1984) and on Soviet perestroika (that is, economic 
restructuring) see, for example, Odom (1987). 
26 Olson (1965) and OIson (1982, pp. 17-35). 
27 Olson (1982, p. 31). 
28 Meade (1972, p. 403). 
29 The Drydocks disposes of 2079 metres of effective wet berth along with seven dry docks with 
a total length of 1405.3 metres. Source: Official Drydocks publicity material. 
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30 The account of the singular strike at Mondragon is described, although sketchily, in Thomas 
& Logan (1982, p. 35) and Zwerdling (1973, pp. 154-8). 
31 Zammit (1984, p. 43). 
32 Zammit (1984, p. 44). This once again explains the occurrence of the industrial disputes of the 
late 1960's. Even during the Labour Administration, significant protest and discontent was voiced 
when the two-thirds pension scheme was introduced. In this particular instance, the drydocks worker 
conceded a status reduction. 
33 McCormick (1969, p. 128). 
34 Organised by the Workers' Participation Development Centre at the University of Malta on 
January 14, 1984. The speech was reported verbatim in the newspaper IT-TORCA as follows: "Tiehu 
sehem fit-tmexxija ma jfissirx biss tiehu sehem fit-tgawdija izda li terfa' wkoll parti mill-piz. Fil-
maltemp wiehed m'ghanduxjahrab mir-responsabilta tat-tmexxija u jippartetipa biss meta l-affarijiet 
mexjin tajjeb biss." 
35 For a vivid account of the 1972 events concerning the Drydocks, see Kester (1980, pp. 48 - 52). 
36 Batstone et. al. (1983). 
37 See Thomas & Logan (1982) on the Mondragon coops; Jackall & Levin {1984} on producer coops 
in the USA. 
38 See, for example, 'Unions in Eastern Europe', in International Labour Reports, 1986, No. 18. 
39 As identified by Baldacchino (1984) and Kester {1986}. 
40 See, for example Weitzman (1984) and McGregor {196O, Chapter 8}. 
41 The cause and effect connection should also be established in the temporal sense: Hence the 
liaison of profits/losses with wages and salaries, which are paid monthly, carries a psychologically 
meaningful behaviour and reward relation. 
42 Bernstein {1976, pp. 65-6}. 
43 This is evident from a comparison of the basic wage rates of occupational grades at the 
Drydocks with the basic wage rates of allied work in private industry. (See Table 5) Drydocks 
wage data has been collected with the kind permission of the Drydocks Council from the Wages 
and Salaries Department at the Drydocks. I also acknowledge the assistance of JoJo Mallia, former 
Council Secretary. 
44 Reports of the survey conducted by the Workers' Participation Development Centre at the 
Drydocks in December 1982 are available in both Maltese and English: See Baldacchino {1984}; 
Zammit & Baldacchino (1984) and Baldacchino et. al. {1986}. 
45 Baldacchino (1984, p. 33) and Baldacchino et. al. {1986, pp. 220-1}. 
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